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The Pinball Wizard

Bill Budge in Electronic Arts software artist pose

Bill Budge in Electronic Arts software artist pose

The name of Bill Budge has already come up from time to time on this blog. Mentioning him has been almost unavoidable, for he was one of the titans amongst early Apple II programmers, worshiped for his graphical wizardry by virtually everyone who played games. As you may remember, his name carried such weight that when Richard Garriott was first contacted by Al Remmers of California Pacific to propose that he allow CP to publish Akalabeth Garriott’s first reaction was a sort of “I’m not worthy” sense of shock at the prospect of sharing a publisher with the great Budge. Having arrived at the time of the birth of Electronic Arts and Budge’s masterpiece, Pinball Construction Set, now seems a good moment to take a step back and look at what made Budge such a star.

Budge was always a tinkerer, always fascinated by the idea of construction sets. As a young kid, he played with blocks, tinker toys, erector sets. As an older kid, he moved on to fiddling with telescopes and model rockets. (“It’s amazing we didn’t kill ourselves.”) After moving about the country constantly when Budge was younger, his family finally ended up in the San Francisco Bay area by the time Budge began high school in the late 1960s. It was a fortuitous move. With the heart of the burgeoning Silicon Valley easily accessible, Budge’s family had found the perfect spot for a boy who liked to tinker with technology. A teacher at his school named Harriet Hungate started a class in “computer math” soon after Budge arrived. The students wrote their programs out by hand, then sent them off to a local company that had agreed to donate some time on their IBM 1401 minicomputer. They then got to learn whether their programs had worked from a printout sent back to the school. It was a primitive way of working, but Budge was immediately smitten. He calls the moment he discovered what a loop is one of the “transcendent moments” in his life. He “just programmed all the time” during his last two years of high school. Hungate was eventually able to finagle a deal with another local business to get a terminal installed at the school with a connection to an HP 2100 machine hosting HP Time-Shared BASIC. Budge spent hours writing computer versions of Tic-tac-toe, checkers, and Go.

But then high school was over. Without the ready access to computers that his high school had afforded him, Budge tried to put his programming behind him. He entered the University of California Santa Cruz as an English major, with vague aspirations toward becoming a novelist. Yet in the end the pull of programming proved too strong. After two years he transferred to Berkeley as a computer-science major. He got his Bachelor’s there, then stayed on to study for a PhD. He was still working on that in late 1978 when the Apple II first entered his life.

As you might expect, the arrival of the trinity of 1977 had prompted considerable discussion within Berkeley’s computer-science department. Budge dithered for a time about whether to buy one, and if so which one. At last friend and fellow graduate student Andy Hertzfeld convinced him to go with the local product of nearby Apple Computer. It wasn’t an easy decision to make; the Commodore PET and the TRS-80 were both much cheaper (a major consideration for a starving student), and the TRS-80 had a vastly larger installed base of users and much more software available. Still, Budge decided that the Apple II was worth the extra money when he saw the Disk II system and the feature that would make his career, the bitmapped hi-res graphics mode. He spent half of his annual income on an Apple II of his own. It was so precious that he would carefully stow the machine away back in its box, securely swaddled in its original protective plastic, whenever he finished using it.

As he explored the possibilities of his treasure, Budge kept coming back again and again to hi-res mode. He worked to divine everything about how it worked and what he might do with it. His first big programming project became to rewrite much of Steve Wozniak’s original game of Breakout which shipped with every early Apple II. He replaced Woz’s graphics code with his own routines to make the game play faster and smoother, more like its arcade inspiration. When he had taken that as far as he could, he started thinking about writing a game of his own. He was well-acquainted with Pong from a machine installed at the local pizza parlor. Now he recreated the experience on the Apple II. He names “getting my first Pong ball bouncing around on the screen” as another of his life’s transcendent moments: “When I finished my version of Pong, it was kind of a magical moment for me. It was night, and I turned the lights off in my apartment and watched the trailing of the ball on the phosphors of my eighty-dollar black and white TV.” He added a number of optional obstacle layouts to the basic template for variety, then submitted the game, which he named Penny Arcade, to Apple themselves. They agreed to trade him a printer for it, and earmarked it for The Apple Tapes, a cassette full of “introductory programs” to be included with every specimen of the new Apple II Plus model they were about to release. In the manual for the collection they misattributed the game to “Bob Budge,” but it mattered little. Soon enough everyone would know his name.

Penny Arcade

Penny Arcade

With his very first game shipping with every Apple II Plus, Budge was naturally happy to continue with his new hobby. He started hanging around the local arcades, observing and taking careful notes on the latest games. Then he would go home and clone them. Budge had little interest in playing the games, and even less in playing the role of game designer. For him, the thrill — the real game, if you will — was in finding ways to make his little Apple II produce the same visuals and gameplay as the arcade machines, or at least as close as he could possibly get. In a few years Atari would be suing people for doing what Budge was doing, but right now the software industry was small and obscure enough that he could get away with it.

Budge’s big breakthrough came when a friend of his introduced him to a traveling sales rep named Al Remmers, who went from store to store selling 8″ floppy disk drives. He and Budge made a deal: Remmers would package the games up in Ziploc baggies and sell them to the stores he visited on his treks, and they would split the profits fifty-fifty. Budge was shocked to earn $7000 for the first month, more than his previous annual income. From this relationship was born Remmers’s brief-lived but significant software-publishing company, California Pacific, as well as Budge’s reputation as the dean of Apple II graphics programmers. His games may not have been original, but they looked and played better than just about anything else out there. To help others who dreamed of doing what he did, he packaged some of his routines together as Bill Budge’s 3-D Graphics System. His reputation was such that this package sold almost as well as his games. This was how easily fame and fortune could come to a really hot programmer for a brief window of a few years, when word traveled quickly in a small community aching for more and better software for their machines.

In fact, his reputation soared so quickly that Apple themselves came calling. Budge, who had been putting less and less effort into his studies as his income from his games increased, dropped out of Berkeley to join his old buddy Andy Hertzfeld in Cupertino. He was made — what else? — a graphics specialist working in the ill-fated Apple III division. He ended up spending only about a year at Apple during 1980 and 1981, but two experiences there would have a huge impact on his future work, and by extension on the field of computer gaming.

While Budge was working at Apple much of the engineering team, including Hertzfeld and even Woz himself, were going through a hardcore pinball phase: “They were students of the game, talking about catches, and how to pass the ball from flipper to flipper, and they really got into it.” Flush with cash as they were after the IPO, many at Apple started filling their houses with pinball tables.

Budge's first pinball game, from Trilogy of Games

Budge’s first pinball game, from Trilogy of Games

Budge didn’t find pinball intrinsically all that much more interesting than he did purely electronic arcade games. Still, one of the first games Budge sold through Remmers had been a simple pinball game, which was later included in his very successful Trilogy of Games package published by California Pacific. Pinball was after all a fairly natural expansion of the simple Pong variants he started with. Now, witnessing the engineers’ enthusiasm led him to consider whether he could do the game better justice, create something on the Apple II that played and felt like real pinball, with the realistic physics that are so key to the game. It was a daunting proposition in some ways, but unusually susceptible to computer simulation in others. A game of pinball is all about physics, with no need to implement an opponent AI. And the action is all centered around that single moving ball while everything else remains relatively static, meaning it should be possible to do on the Apple II despite that machine’s lack of hardware sprites. (This lack made the Apple II less suited for many action games than the likes of the Atari 8-bit computers or even the Atari VCS.) After some months of work at home and after hours, Budge had finished Raster Blaster.

Raster Blaster

Raster Blaster was the best thing Budge had yet done — so good that he decided he didn’t want to give it to California Pacific. Budge felt that Remmers wasn’t really doing much for him by this point, just shoveling disks into his homemade-looking packaging, shipping them off to the distributor SoftSel, and collecting 50% of the money that came back. The games practically sold themselves on the basis of Budge’s name, not California Pacific’s. Budge was a deeply conflict-averse personality, but his father pushed him to cut his ties with California Pacific, to go out on his own and thereby double his potential earnings. And anyway, he was getting bored in his job at Apple. So he quit, and along with his sister formed BudgeCo. He would write the games, just as he always had, and she would handle the business side of things. Raster Blaster got BudgeCo off the ground in fine form. It garnered rave reviews, and became a huge hit in the rapidly growing Apple II community, Budge’s biggest game yet by far. Small wonder — it was the first computer pinball game that actually felt like pinball, and also one of the most graphically impressive games yet seen on the Apple II.

But next came the question of what to do for a follow-up. It was now 1982, and it was no longer legally advisable to blatantly clone established arcade games. Budge struggled for weeks to come up with an idea for an original game, but he got nowhere. Not only did he have no innate talent for game design, he had no real interest in it either. Out of this frustration came the brilliant conceptual leap that would make his legacy.

Above I mentioned that two aspects of Budge’s brief time at Apple would be important. The other was the Lisa project. Budge did not directly work on or with the Lisa team, but he was fascinated by their work, and observed their progress closely. Like any good computer-science graduate student, he had been aware of the work going on at Xerox PARC. Yet he had known the Alto’s interface only as a set of ideas and presentations. When he could actually play with a real GUI on the Lisa prototypes, it made a strong impression. Now it provided a way out of his creative dilemma. He was disinterested in games and game design; what interested him was the technology used to make games. Therefore, why not give people who actually did want to become designers a set of tools to let them do that? Since these people might be no more interested in programming than he was in design, he would not just give them a library of code like the old 3-D Graphics System he had published through California Pacific. No, he would give them a visual design tool to make their own pinball tables, with a GUI interface inspired by the work of the Lisa team.

The original Pinball Construction Set box art, featuring pieces of the pinball machine that Budge disassembled to plan the program

The original Pinball Construction Set box art, featuring pieces of the pinball machine that Budge disassembled to plan the program

Budge had resisted buying a pinball table of his own while at Apple, but now he bought a used model from a local thrift shop. He took it apart carefully, cataloging the pieces that made up the playfield. Just as the Lisa’s interface used a desktop as its metaphor, his program would let the user build a pinball machine from a bin of iconographic spare parts. The project was hugely more ambitious than anything he had tackled before, even if some of the components, such as a simple paint program that let the user customize the look of her table, he had already written for his personal use in developing Raster Blaster. Budge was determined to give his would-be creator as much scope as he possibly could. That meant fifteen different components that she could drag and drop anywhere on the surface of her table. It meant letting her alter gravity or the other laws of physics if she liked. It meant letting her make custom scoring combinations, so that bumping this followed by that gave double points. And, because every creator wants to share her work, it meant letting the user save her custom table as a separate program that her friends could load and play just like they did Budge’s own Raster Blaster. That Budge accomplished all of this, and in just 48 K of memory, makes Pinball Construction Set one of the great feats of Apple II programming. None other than Steve Wozniak has called it “the greatest program ever written for an 8-bit machine.”

Pinball Construction Set

Pinball Construction Set

Amazing as it was, when BudgeCo released Pinball Construction Set at the end of 1982 its sales were disappointing. It garnered nowhere near the attention of Raster Blaster. The software industry had changed dramatically over the previous year. A tiny operation like BudgeCo could no longer just put a game out — even a great, groundbreaking game like PCS — and wait for sales. It was getting more expensive to advertise, harder to get reviews and get noticed in general. Yet when Trip Hawkins came to him a few months later asking to re-release PCS through his new publisher Electronic Arts, Budge was reluctant, nervous of the slick young Hawkins and his slick young company. But Hawkins just wouldn’t take no for an answer; he said he would make Budge and his program stars, said that only he could find PCS the audience its brilliance deserved — and he offered one hell of a nice advance and royalty rate to boot. And EA did have Woz himself on the board of directors, and Woz said he thought signing up would be a smart move. Budge agreed at last; thus BudgeCo passed into history less than two years after its formation.

As good as PCS was, it’s very possible that Hawkins had another, ulterior motive in pursuing Budge with such vigor. To understand how that might have been, we need to understand something about what Budge was like personally. Given the resume I’ve been outlining — spent his best years of high school poring over computer code; regarded his Apple II as his most precious possession; had his most transcendent moments programming it; etc. — you’ve probably already formulated a shorthand picture. If the Budge of that picture is, shall we say, a little bit on the nerdy, introverted side, you can be forgiven. The thing was, however, the real Budge was nothing like what you might expect; as he himself put it, he “didn’t quite fit the mold.” He had a tall, rangy build and handsome features beneath a luxurious head of hair, with striking eyes that a teenage girl might call dreamy. At 29 (although he looked perhaps 22), he was comfortable in his own skin in a way that some people never manage, with an easy grace about him that made others as glad to talk to him as they were to listen. His overall persona smacked more of enlightened California beach bum than hardcore programmer. And he took a great picture. If there was one person amongst Hawkins’s initial crew of developers who could actually pull off the rock star/software artist role, it was Budge; he might even attract a groupie or two. He was a dream come true for the PR firm Hawkins had inherited from his time at Apple, Regis McKenna, Inc. Thus the EA version of PCS was designed to look even more like a contemporary rock album than any of the other games. The name of Bill Budge, the man EA planned to make their very own rock star, was far larger on it than the name of his game.

EA's version of Pinball Construction Set

The down-to-earth Budge himself was rather bemused by EA’s approach, but he shrugged his shoulders and went along with it in his usual easygoing manner. When EA arranged for rock photographer Norman Seeff to do the famous “software artists” photo shoot, they asked that the subjects all wear appropriately bohemian dark clothing to the set. Budge went one better: he showed up with a single studded leather glove he’d bought for dressing up as a punk rocker for a party thrown by the Apple Macintosh team. He brought it simply as a joke, a bit of fun poked at all this rock-star noise. Imagine, then, how shocked he was when Seeff and the others demanded that he actually wear it. Thus Budge in his leather glove became the standout figure from that iconic image. As he later sheepishly admitted, “That’s not really me.” Soon after he got a software-artist photo shoot and advertisement all to himself, filled with vague profundities that may or may not have actually passed his lips beforehand. (“Programming for a microcomputer is like writing a poem using a 600-word vocabulary.”)

EA booked Budge into every gig they could find for him. He did a lengthy one-on-one interview with Charlie Rose for CBS News Nightwatch (“He knew absolutely nothing. He seemed like your typical blow-dried guy without a lot of substance. But I guess I was wrong about him.”); he demonstrated PCS alongside Hawkins on the influential show Computer Chronicles; he featured in a big segment on Japanese television, at a time when that country’s own designers were toiling in obscurity for their parent corporations; he had his photo on the cover of The Wall Street Journal; he was featured alongside the likes of Steve Jobs in an Esquire article on visionaries under the age of forty.

With his album out and the photo shoots done and the promotional spots lined up, it still remained for EA’s rock star to hit the road — to tour. If the highs just described were pretty intoxicating for a computer-game programmer, this part of the process kept him most assuredly grounded. Budge and EA’s Bing Gordon went on a series of what were billed as “Software Artists Tours,” sometimes accompanied by other designers, sometimes alone. The idea was something like a book tour, a chance to sign autographs and meet the adoring fans. Determined to break beyond the ghetto of traditional computer culture, EA booked them not only into computer stores but also into places like Macy’s in New York City, where they were greeted with confusion and bemusement. Even the computer stores sometimes seemed surprised to see them. Whether because of communications problems or flat disinterest, actual fans were often rare or nonexistent at the events. Hawkins’s dream of hordes of fans clutching their EA albums, fighting for an autograph… well, it didn’t happen, even though PCS became a major hit in its new EA duds (it would eventually sell over 300,000 copies across all platforms, a huge figure in those days). Often there seemed to be more press people eager to score an interview than actual fans at the appearances, and often the stores themselves didn’t quite know what to do with their software artists. One manager first demanded that Budge buy himself a new outfit (he was under-dressed in the manager’s opinion to be “working” in his store), then asked him if he could make himself useful by going behind the register and ringing up some customers. “That’s when I realized maybe I wouldn’t be a rock star,” a laconic Budge later said.

Budge wasn’t idle in the down-times between PR junkets. Privileged with one of the few Macintosh prototypes allowed outside of Apple, he used its bundled MacPaint application as the model for MousePaint, a paint program that Apple bundled with the first mouse for the Apple II. He also ported PCS to the Mac. Still, the fans and press were expecting something big, something as revolutionary as PCS itself had been — and small wonder, given the way that EA had hyped him as a visionary.

One of the most gratifying aspects of PCS had been the unexpected things people found to do with it, things that often had little obvious relationship to the game of pinball. Children loved to fill the entire space with bumpers, then watch the ball bouncing about among them like a piece of multimedia art. Others liked to just use the program’s painting subsections to make pictures, scattering the ostensible pinball components here and there not for their practical functions but for aesthetic purposes. If people could make such creative use of a pinball kit, what might they do with something more generalized? As uninterested as ever in designing a game in the traditional sense, Budge began to think about how he could take the concept of the construction set to the next step. He imagined a Construction Set Construction Set, a completely visual programming environment that would let the user build anything she liked — something like ThingLab, an older and admittedly somewhat obtuse stab at the idea that existed at Xerox PARC. His ideas about Construction Set Construction Set were, to say the least, ambitious:

“I could build anything from Pac-Man to Missile Command to a very, very powerful programming language. It’s the kind of a program that has a very wide application. A physics teacher, for example, could build all kinds of simulations, of little micro-worlds, set up different labs and provide dynamic little worlds that aren’t really videogames.”

It turned out to be a bridge too far. Budge tinkered with the idea for a couple of years, but never could figure out how to begin to really implement it. (Nor has anyone else in the years since.) In fact, he never made a proper follow-up to PCS at all. Ironically, Budge, EA’s software artist who best looked the part, was one of the least able to play the role in the long term. As becomes clear upon reading any interview with Budge, old or new, his passion is not for games; it’s for code. In the early days of computer gaming the very different disciplines of programming and game design had been conflated into one due to the fact that most of the people who owned computers and were interested in making games for them were programmers. During the mid-1980s, however, the two roles began to pull apart as the people who used computers and the way games were developed changed. Budge fell smack into the chasm that opened up in the middle. Lauded as a brilliant designer, he was in reality a brilliant programmer. People expected from him something he didn’t quite know how to give them, although he tried mightily with his Construction Set Construction Set idea.

Budge at home in early 1985, the beginning of his "years in the wilderness"

Budge at home in early 1985, the beginning of his “years in the wilderness”

So, he finally just gave up. After 1984 the interviews and appearances and celebrity petered out. His continuing royalties from PCS made work unnecessary for some years, so he all but gave up programming, spending most of his time wind-surfing instead (a sport that Bing Gordon, perhaps to his regret, had taught him). Most people would have a problem going back to obscurity after being on television and newspaper features and even having their own magazine column (in Softalk), but it seemed to affect Budge not at all: “I’m kind of glad when I don’t have anything new out and people forget about me.” Eventually EA quietly accepted that they weren’t going to get another game from him and quit calling. Budge refers to this period as his “years in the wilderness.” By 1990 the name of Bill Budge, such a superstar in his day, came up only when the old-timers started asking each other, “Whatever happened to….?”

In the early 1990s, Budge, now married and more settled, decided to return to the games industry, first to work on yet another pinball game, Virtual Pinball for the Sega Genesis console. Without the pressure of star billing to live up to and with a more mature industry to work in that had a place for his talents as a pure programmer’s programmer, he decided to continue his career at last. He’s remained in the industry ever since, unknown to the public but respected immensely by his peers within the companies for which he’s worked. For Budge, one of those people who has a sort of innate genius for taking life as it comes, that seems more than enough. Appropriately enough, he’s spent most of his revived careers as what’s known as a tools programmer, making utilities that others then use to make actual games. In that sense his career, bizarre as its trajectory has been, does have a certain consistency.

PCS, his one towering achievement as a software artist, deserves to be remembered for at least a couple of reasons. First of all there is of course its status as the first really elegant tool to let anyone make a game she could be proud of. It spawned a whole swathe of other “construction set” software, from EA and others, all aimed at fostering this most creative sort of play. That’s a beautiful legacy to have. Yet its historical importance is greater than even that would imply. PCS represents to my knowledge the first application of the ideas that began at Xerox PARC to an ordinary piece of software which ordinary people could buy at an ordinary price and run on ordinary computers. It proved that you didn’t need an expensive workstation-class machine like the Apple Lisa to make friendlier, more intuitive software; you could do it on a 48 K Apple II. No mouse available? Don’t let that stop you; use a joystick or a set of paddles or just the arrow keys. Thousands and thousands of people first saw a GUI interface in the form of Pinball Construction Set. Just as significantly, thousands of other designers saw its elegance and started implementing similar interfaces in their own games. The floating, disembodied hand of PCS, so odd when the game first appeared, would be seen everywhere in games within a couple of years of its release. And game manuals soon wouldn’t need to carefully define “icon,” as the PCS manual did. PCS is a surprising legacy for the Lisa project to have; certainly the likes of it weren’t anything anyone involved with Lisa was expecting or aiming for. But sometimes legacies are like that.

Next time we’ll look at another of those seminal early EA games. If you’d like to try to make something of your own in the meantime, here’s the Apple II disk image and manual for Pinball Construction Set.

(What with his celebrity in Apple II circles between 1979 and 1985, there’s a lot of good information on Budge available in primary-source documents from the period. In particular, see the November 1982 Softline, the December 1985 Compute!’s Gazette, the March 1985 Electronic Games, the March 1985 Enter, the September 1984 Creative Computing, and Budge’s own column in later issues of Softalk. Budge is also featured in Halcyon Days, and Wired magazine published a retrospective on his career when he was given a Pioneer Award by the Academy of Interactive Arts and Sciences in 2011. Budge’s interview at the awards ceremony was videotaped and is available for viewing online.)

 
 

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Seeing Farther

Trip Hawkins at the new Electronic Arts offices, 1983

Trip Hawkins at the new Electronic Arts offices, 1983

Born in northern California in 1953, William M. “Trip” Hawkins III was the perfect age to be captured by the tabletop experiential games that had begun to arrive in force by his teenage years. He experimented with the Avalon Hill wargames, but what really captured his imagination was Strat-o-Matic Football. A huge football fan, he loved the idea of guiding a team game by game through the drama of a full NFL season — loved it enough that he was willing to put up with all of the dice-rolling and math that were part of the process. Unfortunately, his friends were not so entranced. After taking a look at the closely printed manual and all of the complicated forms, they threw up their hands and asked Trip if he’d maybe like to just watch some TV instead. Here was born for Hawkins a lifelong antipathy toward the “boob tube,” a belief that such a passive, brain-numbing medium could and should be superseded by other, interactive forms of entertainment. Yet he had also run into the classic experiential gamer’s dilemma. To wring a dramatic experience out of Strat-o-Matic you had to spend far too much time fiddling with numbers and mundane details. Some people revel in that sort of thing, losing themselves in games as systems. Hawkins’s friends, however, wanted them to be lived experiences. Fiddling with the system only clouded the fictional context that really interested them, and made the whole thing feel far too much like schoolwork.

Then, in 1971, Hawkins saw his first computer, a DEC PDP-8. The answer to his dilemma seemed clear: he could run games on the computer, letting the machine handle all of the boring stuff. Being possessed of a strong entrepreneurial streak — he would start his first (unsuccessful) business venture before the age of 20, selling a Strat-o-Matic-inspired football game of his own design — he decided that his mission in life would be to start a company to make computer games. By this he imagined not the simple arcade games that would soon begin appearing in bars and shopping malls, but richer, deeper experiences in the spirit of the board games that had so equally enticed and frustrated him.

As I mentioned in my last article, Hawkins was possessed of some of the same qualities that marked the young Steve Jobs, including intense charisma and the associated reality distortion field that made him able to convince older and presumably wiser people to do highly improbable things. He thus became the first and (I assume) only person ever to graduate from Harvard with a degree in “Strategy and Applied Game Theory,” for which he combined social-science and computer-science courses. He thought what he learned would aid him both in the real world of business and the simulated worlds he hoped to create. He used his access to computers at Harvard to refine his ideas, continuing to tinker with what would always remain his biggest gaming love, football simulations. In 1975, the arrival of the microprocessor and the first kit microcomputers such as the Altair made him sit down and try to decide on a date when this new technology would make his dream of a home-computer-entertainment company viable. He claims to have decided then that 1982 would be the perfect moment. And indeed, 1982 would be the year that he would found Electronic Arts. If that all sounds a little bit too neat to be entirely believable, the fact still remains that the patience and dedication he showed in the face of considerable temptation to go down other paths is, as we shall see, amazing. As the next step in his master plan, he went off to Stanford for an MBA. And then came Apple, and a pivotal role in the Lisa project.

Hawkins was one of the beneficiaries of Apple’s IPO at the end of 1980; his first two-and-a-half years in the workforce made him a millionaire, free never to work again if he didn’t feel like it. With incentives like that, and a position as marketing director for one of the most prominent young companies in the country, it would be easy to forgive him for putting games in the category of childish things left behind. Yet he never forgot his dream through those years at Apple. Hawkins was the outlier amongst a management team not just disinterested in games but a little bit afraid of them as indicative of a product line less “serious” (read: useful for business) than IBM’s. Even whilst dutifully trying to ingratiate Apple with po-faced businessmen, Hawkins kept up with the thriving game scene on the Apple II. Witnessing the success of companies like Brøderbund and On-Line, he began to fret that the entertainment revolution was coming even sooner than he had anticipated, and that he was missing it. In January of 1982, he thus told his colleagues that he wanted to resign for the most preposterous of reasons: he wanted to start a game company. Hawkins at first acquiesced when they told him how foolish he was to walk away from a company like Apple, but a few months later he resigned again, and this time stuck to his guns.

On May 28, 1982, Hawkins officially founded the venture he had been dreaming of for over ten years under the truly awful name of Amazin’ Software. He was just 28 years old. He had a small fortune of his own to inject into the company thanks to the Apple IPO, but he would need much, much more to launch on the lavish scale he envisioned. Fortunately, he had an established relationship with an investor named Don Valentine, head of Sequoia Capital, one of the most important sources of start-up funding in Silicon Valley. Valentine and Sequoia had already helped to fund Atari, Apple, and Shugart (developers of the floppy disk) among others. Now he found Hawkins’s vision of a next-generation entertainment-software publisher compelling. He became more like a business partner than an investor, providing much more than money. After working out of his home for a few months, Hawkins set up shop inside Sequoia’s offices when he began to hire his first employees. As Valentine later wryly explained, he told Hawkins he had to leave only when Hawkins’s own people exceeded the number of Sequoia people in the building. Hawkins then moved his company to a spacious three-story building in San Mateo, California, where it would remain for the next fifteen years. To begin to fill the space, Hawkins put together a team made from ex-Apple people (like Joe Ybarra), ex-Xerox PARC people (like Tim Mott), ace advertising executives (like Bing Gordon, who would remain with the company for more than 25 years), people from other games companies, from IBM, from Visicorp. Even Steve Wozniak agreed to sit on the board of directors.

But, you might ask, just what did all these people find so compelling about Hawkins’s vision? Well, he proposed a completely new approach to computer games — to the way that they were designed, programmed, marketed, and even played (or, more accurately, he wished to change who played them). As I’ve described in earlier articles on this blog, the computer-game industry was growing rapidly by 1982, and with the arrival of new, inexpensive yet capable platforms like the Commodore 64 was beginning to attract serious attention from people like Don Valentine as the potential next big thing to replace the increasingly moribund game consoles. Yet the industry had also only recently left the Ziploc era behind. Its products — full of garish cover art, typo-riddled manuals, bugs, and cryptic user interfaces — still bore an unmistakeable whiff of the dingy basements in which they were created. In short, computer games still felt almost as much hobby as business. Hawkins proposed to change that, by selling games tailored to ordinary consumers, games with the same professional polish found in the book and music industries. He felt the best way to do that was not to devalue the creative component of games and sell them as simply toys or product, as Atari had been doing for years with its game cartridges. Indeed, Atari’s current struggles illustrated that this was exactly the wrong approach. No, the best way to sell games was to celebrate them as art, made by real artists. Thus the eventual title of his company, arrived at after a long day of brainstorming in October of 1982: Electronic Arts. It was simple, classy, elegant, everything Hawkins wanted his games to be, in contrast to the scruffy products of the first-generation companies with whom he’d be competing.

Hawkins spent considerable time refining his ideas for the new “consumer software” he wanted EA to produce. Eventually he arrived at a formula: EA’s games must be “simple, hot, and deep.”

Many of his ideas about simplicity came from the Lisa project. Like the Lisa’s desktop, the interface in EA games should be as simple as possible and as much as possible prompted by obvious visual cues right there on the screen. There should be no cryptic command-key sequences, and it shouldn’t be necessary to read the manual to learn how to play.

“Hotness” is the most abstract of the three qualities. It’s not quite the same as Marshall McLuhan’s definition of the term in Understanding Media, although there is a definite kinship. Hawkins described it as meaning that the program take maximum advantage of what he saw as the four important strengths of the computer as an artistic medium: video and, increasingly with the arrival of the Commodore 64 and its magnificent SID chip, sound; interactivity, the single quality that most distinguished it from any other form of electronic media; and the ability to have hidden computational machinery to solve the bookkeeping problem that had so frustrated him in the tabletop simulations he had played as a kid. Hawkins wanted his games to push all four qualities “as far as you can” on each platform for which they were released.

Finally there is the notion of depth. Hawkins wanted EA’s games to strive for that classic ideal of being simple to learn and play, but challenging — and infinitely interesting — to master. He also pointedly considered this quality to be the real differentiation between the new generation of computer games to be made by EA and the old console and standup arcade games that were aimed at the same market of ordinary consumers. Sustained interest, he argued, required depth, and it was exactly the lack of same that had caused consumers to lose interest in Atari’s games in a way they wouldn’t in those of EA. He liked to say that arcade games were reactive rather than interactive, requiring the player to use her reflexes but not her intelligence or creativity.

There’s a definite sense of the over-optimistic here, particularly in this belief in the power of depth. A parade of truly awful games that have nevertheless become huge hits in the years since the Great Videogame Crash rather puts the lie to the idea that people would come to reject bad designs that seem determined to insult their intelligence. Nevertheless, much of Hawkins’s vision did indeed end up coming true. In his book A Casual Revolution from 2010, Jesper Juul laid out the qualities he feels define the new generation of casual games now played by a huge swathe of the population. The successful ones are, he writes: possessed of an immediately identifiable fictional context; easy to play for the first time; easily interruptable, and accepting of any level of player dedication; difficult enough to be interesting but not difficult enough to frustrate; and “juicy,” offering a constant, colorful stream of feedback to every action to hold the player’s interest. Juul’s criteria benefit from many additional years of gaming history, but they aren’t that horribly far from Hawkins’s vision for gaming back in 1982. That’s not to say that the casual model of gaming is or should be the only viable model — indeed, EA themselves would depart from it constantly over the years, and often for good reasons — but as a blueprint for consumer software, it’s hard to beat. When I played some early EA titles again recently after spending the last couple of years immersed in games of earlier vintage for this blog, I felt like I’d crossed some threshold into, if not quite modernity, at least something that felt a whole lot closer to it.

All of Hawkins’s design goals seemed great in the abstract, but of course to realize them he’d need to find actual designers capable of crafting that elusive combination of simple and deep gameplay. Not wanting to take any chances, he decided to go with several proven hands along with newcomers for EA’s first titles. He therefore made a list of those whose work had impressed him and started making calls, asking them to publish their next game through EA. To entice them, he offered exactly what you might expect, advances (a first for the industry) and generous royalty rates. That, however, was only the beginning of the pitch. Hawkins promised to do everything possible to let his developers and designers just do what they did best: create. To do so he would borrow liberally from the model of other forms of entertainment. Each development team would be assigned an in-house producer who would be their point of contact with EA and who would make sure all the boring stuff got done: arranging testing, arranging ports to other machines, adding copy protection, getting the manual written, keeping contracts up to date, coordinating with advertising and packaging designers. (EA’s early star in this role would be Joe Ybarra, who shepherded a string of classic titles through development.) In the long term, Hawkins also promised them access to a suite of in-house development tools, including workstation computers, tools to develop video and audio content and even in-house artists to help them use them, a cross-platform FORTH compiler. Such tools would not always be used as widely or as soon as Hawkins had hoped, but they were, like so much else about EA, a preview of how game development would work in the future. But the most enticing thing that Hawkins offered his developers, and by far the most remembered today, was an appeal aimed straight at their egos: he promised to make them rock stars.

Hawkins had decided, logically enough, that if computer games were art then those who created them had to be considered artists. In fact, he decided to build EA’s June 1983 launch around this premise of “software artists.” Each EA game box bore a carefully crafted mission statement that made the company sound more like an artistic enclave than a for-profit corporation:

We’re an association of electronic artists who share a common goal. We want to fulfill the potential of personal computing. That’s a tall order. But with enough imagination and enthusiasm we believe there’s a good chance for success. Our products, like this game, are evidence of our intent. If you’d like to get involved, please write to us at…

Said boxes themselves were a slim-line design deliberately evocative of record albums, with big gate-fold insides featuring pictures and profiles of the artists behind the work. Hawkins imagined that, just as you always bought the new album from your favorite band, you would rush to buy the next game from Bill Budge or Dan Bunten; that every hip household would eventually have a shelf full of EA games waiting to be pulled down and played in lieu of an evening of television.

Indeed, EA’s first big advertising blitz was designed to demonstrate just what a hip and important new artistic medium the computer was. Hawkins had his stable of developers photographed in brooding rock-star poses lifted straight from an Annie Leibowitz shoot for Rolling Stone — which was appropriate, because EA largely bypassed the traditional computer press to run them in just that sort of glossy mainstream magazine.

early EA advertisement

The advertising headlines argued for software as the next great art form: “We See Farther”; “Can a Computer Make You Cry?” (The answer to the latter was essentially “We’re working on it.”) Nobody had ever promoted computer games quite like this. It was, if nothing else, audacious as all hell.

But now we come to the part of the article where we have to ask What It All Means. We have to be careful here. It would be very easy to look at the idealistic sentiments in those early advertisements, compare it with the allegedly soulless corporate behemoth that is EA today (voted “Worst Company in America” for 2012), and drift off into an elegiac for the artistic integrity of the early days of gaming and the perpetual adolescence and sequel-driven creative bankruptcy the medium seems to be caught in today. That’s very, very easy to do, as demonstrated by the countless other blog entries in just that mold that you’ll find all over the Internet; I even did it once myself back in graduate school. Nor is it precisely a point of view without merit. Still, before we go too far down that sepia-toned road let’s make room for some other facets of all this.

There may be more similarities between the EA of 1983 and the EA of today than nostalgia likes to admit. A certain streak of cold corporate ruthlessness was a part of EA’s personality even then. For all the idealism, EA wasn’t terribly interested in playing nice with the others who had already done so much toward building this new industry. They bypassed the established distribution system that Ken Williams had first begun to build back in 1980 in favor of setting up their own network that let them sell their products to stores directly. It may seem a small thing, but the message was that EA didn’t need the rest of the industry, that now the adults were ready to take over, thank you. The first-generation publishers tended to view EA as wealthy carpetbaggers swooping in to capitalize on what they had spent years building. Yes, part of that was just inevitable jealousy toward the well-financed, well-connected Hawkins who never had to start his company on the shoestrings that they did, but there’s also a grain of truth to their complaints. June of 1983 marks as good a line of demarcation as any for the final end of the era that Doug Carlston called the software Brotherhood. The industry would be a different place in the post-EA era. The games would be better, more polished and sophisticated, but the competition would also be more ruthless, the atmosphere colder, everything slicker and more calculated. It’s hard not to feel that EA had something to do with that. The fact is that EA was always known to its competitors as a company of hard edges and sharp elbows.

One other thing that’s always lost in nostalgic reminiscence over EA’s first advertising campaign is the awkward fact that it actually didn’t work out all that terribly well. EA found that the mainstream public did not respond as they had hoped to their software artists, and within six months had already begun to switch gears, away from advertising the creators and back to advertising their creations on their own merits, as was the norm for other publishers. They also returned to the trade press for promotion, and often relaxed Hawkins’s rules for consumer software in favor of titles that catered more to the hardcore. Within a few years EA would have extended dungeon crawls, tough-as-nails adventure games, and strategy games with thick manuals, just like everybody else did. It turned out that consumers — or, perhaps more accurately, the PCs of the era — weren’t yet quite ready for consumer software. EA would turn into a very successful publisher, but not the force for widespread, mainstream cultural change Hawkins had imagined. Games would still be viewed by most of the tastemakers as kids’ stuff for many years to come. When that became clear (as it did in fairly short order), EA would continue to credit their developers on the box covers and to offer photos inside, but no longer made them the centerpiece of their marketing. Certainly there were no more developers-as-rock-stars photos like the one above.

Which brings us to another point that’s worthwhile to note. I have no doubt that much of the idealistic sentiment in those early advertisements was genuine, just as I have no doubt that Hawkins really, genuinely loved games and the potential of games and wanted to bring them to more people. Yet EA was also a business, funded by unsentimental people like Don Valentine. They ultimately demanded that EA live up to its earning potential. If presenting themselves to the public as an enclave of artists worked to do that, great. If making great, groundbreaking games did that, double great. But when push came to shove, EA needed to make money. Even the advertisement above displays as much cold calculation as it does idealism. There’s something not quite genuine about all those nerds mugging like rock stars. The message of the advertisements resonates so because it was good PR, that perfectly connected with what EA wanted to be and — just as importantly — with what so many commentators today so desperately want them to have been. But, like the iconic Infocom advertisements that still largely define perceptions of that company, it’s also a very, very carefully crafted piece of calculated rhetoric. So, What It All Means is… complicated.

But to return to firmer ground, that of the games themselves: they were mostly good. Often really, really good. EA launched that June with seven titles available or announced: M.U.L.E., by Dan Bunten and his company Ozark Softscape; Archon, by Free Fall Associates; Murder on the Zinderneuf, also by Free Fall; Worms? by David Maynard; Pinball Construction Set by Bill Budge; Hard Hat Mack by Michael Abbot and Matthew Alexander; and Axis Assassin by John Field. Perhaps surprisingly given Hawkins’s connections to Apple, the first four of those originated on the Atari 8-bit machines, only the last three on the Apple II. On the other hand, with the Commodore 64 still quite new and something of an unknown quantity as these games were in development, the Atari machines were the best qualified to realize Hawkins’s vision of audiovisually “hot” games. (EA funded ports to most viable platforms as a matter of course for most games, so all of these titles did eventually reach several platforms.)

EA’s starting lineup was so good and so important to gaming history that I want to look at several of them individually. We’ll get started with that next time.

(There are several good interviews and articles about EA’s history available on the Internet. That said, it’s also worthwhile to go back to the spate of interviews and articles that greeted EA’s entrance back in 1983. Particularly good ones can be found in the October 1983 Byte, the July/August 1983 Softline, and the October 1983 Computer Gaming World.)

 
 

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